Search Completed | Title | Safety of Grid Scale Lithium-ion Battery Energy Storage Systems
Original File Name Searched: EN010106-004026-DL2-Li-ion-BESS-safety-concerns_Redacted.pdf | Google It | Yahoo | Bing

Page | 031 – 30 – June 5, 2021 Appendix 4 – Fire Safety Planning requirements in the Local Authorities’ Joint Response to the Sunnica statutory consultation This Appendix deals point by point with the BESS requirements in the Local Authority response (text in blue) pp 74 – 75. Sunnica should produce a risk reduction strategy as the responsible person for the scheme as stated in the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005. It is expected that safety measures and risk mitigation is developed in collaboration with services across both counties. The Local Authorities require that the Fire Services work with Sunnica to prepare fire safety and risk mitigation measures. The Cambridgeshire and Suffolk Fire Services are therefore the only public bodies with independent oversight of BESS safety. The use of batteries (including lithium-ion) as Energy Storage Systems (ESS) is a relatively new practice in the global renewable energy sector. As with all new and emerging practices within UK industry, the SFRS would like to work with the developers to better understand any risks that may be posed and develop strategies and procedures to mitigate these risks. This paper is provided as input to this process, which appears to be insufficiently understood. The promoter must ensure the risk of fire is minimised by: • Procuring components and using construction techniques which comply with all relevant legislation. This overlooks the points made in this paper that (i) existing legislation is being ignored by the statutory regulatory body, the HSE (ii) no adequate engineering standards exist to exercise Prevention measures over what is by now a very well-known hazard, viz. thermal runaway. Public Health and Safety cannot be assured whilst either of these situations continues. • Developing an emergency response plan with both counties fire services to minimise the impact of an incident during construction, operation and decommissioning of the facility. • Ensuring the BESS is located away from residential areas. Prevailing wind directions should be factored into the location of the BESS to minimise the impact of a fire involving lithium-ion batteries due to the toxic fumes produced. This is impossible to satisfy. All the BESS compounds in the Sunnica proposal are sufficiently close to residential areas to present a major danger of toxic fumes in the event of an accident. Plume dispersal modelling should be performed to ensure that concentrations of HF cannot exceed dangerous thresholds in the event of the worst credible accident in a BESS compound. • The emergency response plan should include details of the hazards associated with lithium-ion batteries, isolation of electrical sources to enable firefighting activities, measures to extinguish or cool batteries involved in fire, management of toxic or flammable gases, minimise the environmental impact of an incident, containment of fire water run-off, handling and responsibility for disposal of damaged batteries, establishment of regular onsite training exercises. This requirement is very broad but insufficiently detailed. Means of cooling would require water volumes many times in excess of those requested. Management of inflammable gases is best addressed by venting, but that exacerbates the hazard of toxic gas plumes. Large water volumes may lead to unrealistic or impossible requirements for the containment, and subsequent disposal, of the contaminated water resulting from the fire-fighting activity. Other sections of this paper address these points. • The emergency response plan should be maintained and regularly reviewed by Sunnica and any material changes notified to SFRS and CFRS.
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